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Abstract Two experiments tested the hypothesis that a
positive mood can increase attendance to, and systematic
processing of, threatening health information, particularly
when the information is self-relevant. In Study 1, a positive
mood increased differentiation between strong and weak
arguments in a threatening health message about RSI only
for participants who had received false feedback regarding
their high vulnerability to RSI. Mood had no effects under
conditions of low vulnerability. In Study 2, a positive mood
speeded up responses to self-threatening words—compared
with neutral words—for smokers who had just read a
threatening health message about smoking. The authors
conclude that fostering a positive mood may promote
attendance to and systematic processing of information that
threatens the self, and hence contribute to the success of
health campaigns targeted at individuals who are vulnera-
ble to specific health risks.
Keywords Mood  Vulnerability  Information
processing  Threatening health message  Persuasion
Introduction
I can’t seem to face up to the facts
I’m tense and nervous and I can’t relax’’—David
Byrne (Talking Heads)
Mood has a profound impact on the way people perceive
the world around them. Over the years, mood has been
shown to affect memory processes (e.g., Schwarz and Clore
1996), judgment and decision-making (e.g., Clore et al.
1994; Forgas 1995, 2000; Sinclair and Mark 1992), and
persuasion (e.g., Bless et al. 1990; Wegener et al. 1995).
Mood also affects the strategies people use when processing
incoming information. In general, positive moods appear to
promote global, flexible, intuitive and holistic information
processing (see Isen 1999, 2004 for overviews). Negative
moods, in contrast, have been associated with more sys-
tematic, narrow, focused, and analytic forms of processing
(see Schwarz and Clore 1996 for a review).
Mood does not, however, produce consistent main
effects on information processing. On the contrary, the
effects of mood appear flexible, and context dependent. For
instance, the effects of mood may be moderated by the
personal interpretation of its implications (Martin and
Stoner 1996; Martin et al. 1993), and by situational
demands (e.g., Abele et al. 2005; Baumann and Kuhl 2005).
Furthermore, the effects of mood on information processing
appear to vary with message valence. According to the
hedonic contingency view of mood, people generally strive
to maintain, or attain positive mood states (Wegener and
Petty 1994). In positive mood states, people are most likely
to attend to information that is hedonically rewarding, i.e.
messages that contain uplifting and positive information,
and least likely to attend to messages that may spoil a good
mood. A positive mood is thus proposed to induce sys-
tematic processing of uplifting messages, and heuristic
processing of aversive, unpleasant messages (Wegener et al.
1995). In a negative mood, information processing will be
much less contingent on the hedonic consequences of a
message, simply because negative moods are more likely to
improve regardless of message content. In general,
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empirical studies have supported hedonic contingency
assumptions (see Hullett 2005, for a meta-analysis).
Nevertheless, recent findings suggest that a positive
mood may promote systematic processing of negative
information when the information is relevant to the self
(Raghunathan and Trope 2002). At first glance, these find-
ings appear at odds with hedonic contingency assumptions.
Clearly, there is little hedonic reward in facing negative or
even threatening facts about the self. These findings thus
suggest that there are instances where a positive mood does
not promote a hedonic pursuit of pleasure, but rather attunes
individuals to ‘face up to the facts’. In the next section, we
discuss this particular function of mood, and the moderating
role of self-relevance in more detail.
Mood and self-threatening information
People are generally reluctant to face unpleasant, self-rel-
evant facts. For instance, people tend to downplay
unfavorable feedback about their personalities by conjuring
up reasons that undermine the accuracy of the feedback
(e.g., Ditto and Lopez 1992; Trope et al. 2001; Trope and
Neter 1994). Similarly, receivers of threatening health
messages often trivialize the personal relevance of the
information, minimize the seriousness of a health risk, or
engage in wishful thinking (e.g., Das et al. 2003; Jemmott
et al. 1986). From a self-regulation perspective, such
responses serve an important function: they protect an
individual against negative emotions such as fear, anxiety,
and depression (Aspinwall 1998; Raghunathan and Trope
2002; Trope and Neter 1994; Trope and Fishbach 2000),
and help to maintain a positive self-image (e.g., Reed and
Aspinwall 1998; Sherman et al. 2000). Nevertheless, not
facing the facts can be a problem, particularly in the health
domain, where persuasive messages are designed to pre-
vent illness. Hence, recent research efforts have focused on
strategies that make individuals more accepting of aversive
yet self-relevant information.
One strategy that appears to increase acceptance of self-
threatening information is the induction of a positive mood.
Specifically, a positive mood may increase relative interest
in negative feedback about the self, thus attenuating a
global preference for positive feedback (Trope and Pom-
erantz 1998). In addition, a positive mood increased
interest in feedback about individual weaknesses only
when the information was relevant to a self-related goal
(Gervey et al. 2005). Of particular relevance to the present
study, the induction of a positive mood enhanced persua-
sion regarding a message that described the harmful effects
of caffeine intake only when the information was relevant
to the self, i.e. only for caffeine consumers (Raghunathan
and Trope 2002). When the information was not relevant to
the self, a positive mood had no effects on persuasion.
With respect to information processing, the effects of a
positive mood may also be moderated by self-relevance.
When an aversive message is irrelevant to the self, sys-
tematic message processing has personal costs, because it
spoils a good mood, and no personal benefits, because there
are no implications for the self. Accordingly, a positive
mood is likely to instigate a pursuit of hedonic concerns, and
promote less systematic modes of information processing
(Wegener et al. 1995). For messages with high relevance to
the self, intensive message processing will entail short-term
affective costs (see Raghunathan and Trope 2002 for evi-
dence relevant to this proposition), but also benefit the self in
the longer run, e.g. by acquiring valuable information that
may help improve an important self-concept (cf. Wegener
et al. 1995). In these conditions, a positive mood is likely to
promote systematic message processing (Raghunathan and
Trope 2002). In short, recent research suggests that indi-
viduals may sometimes use a positive mood as a resource to
‘‘overcome’’ the short term affective costs of systematically
processing potentially threatening information, in order to
acquire longer-term benefits of the information for the self.
The precise dynamics of this process, however, have not yet
been systematically addressed.
More in particular, solid evidence regarding the interac-
tive effects of self-relevance and mood on information
processing has remained lacking (see Trope et al. 2001).
According to dual-process models of persuasion (Petty and
Wegener 1999), a comprehensive and robust test of infor-
mation processing would require effects of the quality of the
arguments in a persuasive message on two types of depen-
dent measures (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Specifically,
systematic processing is inferred if participants differentiate
between strong and weak arguments on attitudes toward a
persuasive message (Petty and Wegener 1999). In other
words, participants who process a message systematically
should agree more with this message to the extent that it
contains strong arguments, rather than weak arguments. In
addition, systematic message processing manifests itself by
the extent and valence of issue-relevant thoughts recipients
generate in response to the message, such that recipients
should generate more thoughts supportive of message con-
tent, and less thoughts discounting message content, to the
extent that a message contains strong arguments, rather than
weak arguments (Petty and Wegener 1999).
Thus far, interactions between self-relevance, mood and
argument quality on thoughts and attitudes toward a
threatening message have not been tested empirically. In
addition, apart, from the postulated effects of mood on
controlled, systematic processing, it is unclear whether the
effects of mood also extend to more automatic, implicit
forms of information processing. Recent studies suggest
that a positive mood promotes access to implicit, intuitive
knowledge of what is relevant to the self, in terms of
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general goals, motives, and experiences (Baumann and
Kuhl 2003; Bolte et al. 2003; Koole and Kuhl 2003), and
attunes individuals to ‘the grand scheme of things’ (Trope
et al. 2001). A positive mood may thus promote access to
implicit, intuitive resources needed to judge the self-rele-
vance of incoming information, and, if necessary, switch
processing mode (see Baumann and Kuhl 2005 for evi-
dence relevant to this assumption). However, the implicit
processes involved in the effects of mood on the accep-
tance of self-threatening information have received little
empirical attention.
The key objective of the present research is thus to
extend previous findings by providing robust empirical
tests of the cognitive processes involved in the effects of
mood on the acceptance of threatening health information
in two specific ways. First, the present study provides an
explicit test of the interactive effects of self-relevance,
mood, and argument quality on cognitive processes and
persuasion (Petty and Wegener 1999). Second, the present
research extends previous findings by testing implicit
responses to self-threatening versus non-threatening infor-
mation. The central hypothesis that we put forward is that a
positive mood will promote both controlled, systematic
processing of self-threatening health information (Study 1),
as well as automatic, implicit attendance to self-threatening
information (Study 2).
Overview and hypotheses
Two experimental studies were conducted to assess the
effects of mood on information processing and acceptance
of threatening health messages. In line with previous
studies (Raghunathan and Trope 2002), we hypothesized
that self-relevance will moderate the effects of mood on the
controlled and automatic processing of threatening per-
suasive messages. Under conditions of high self-relevance
(i.e., when vulnerability to a health risk is high), a positive
mood was expected to induce explicit systematic message
processing, and speed up implicit responses to self-threat-
ening words, compared with neutral words. Under
conditions of low self-relevance (i.e., when vulnerability to
a health risk is low), a positive mood was expected to
promote heuristic message processing, and have no effects
of implicit responses to threat.
We manipulated mood by asking participants to recall
three positive or three negative experiences from the past
(cf. Raghunathan and Trope 2002). Self-relevance was
varied by presenting participants with false feedback
regarding their vulnerability to a health risk (Study 1), or
by self-reported health risk behavior (Study 2). The present
research extended previous findings by including multiple
measures of information processing. First, we manipulated
argument quality in the persuasive messages. Past research
has shown that sensitivity to the quality of the arguments in
a persuasive message is a reliable indicator of elaborate
cognitive processing (Petty and Wegener 1999). Hence, we
included this manipulation in order to assess the underlying
nature of the cognitive processes that were elicited by our
mood and vulnerability manipulations. Second, we inclu-
ded a thought-listing measure that allowed us to assess the
number and valence of responses to the health message.
Third, we measured response latencies to self-threatening
words versus neutral words to assess implicit mood effects.
As far as we know, no study has measured implicit
responses to threatening versus non-threatening stimuli as a
function of mood.
Study 1
Study 1 manipulated both self-relevance and mood in one
design and assessed their additive and interactive effects on
information processing. Based on dual-process models of
persuasion, this study assessed message elaboration, i.e.,
the extent to which participants engage in systematic pro-
cessing, in two ways: (1) we manipulated argument quality
in a health message in order to assess message elaboration,
and (2) assessed the number and profile of issue-relevant
thoughts (cf. Petty and Wegener 1999). We predicted that a
positive mood would increase sensitivity to the quality of
the arguments in a health message only when this infor-
mation is self-relevant, i.e., under conditions of high
personal vulnerability to a health risk, and thus increase
persuasion for strong arguments, and decrease persuasion
for weak arguments. In contrast, under conditions of low
vulnerability, a positive mood was expected to induce
heuristic processing, and thus decrease a differentiation
between strong and weak arguments.
Method
Participants and design
A total of 121 students at a university of a large city par-
ticipated in the experiment. The sample consisted of 51
male and 70 female participants with a mean age of
22 years (SD = 2.40). Participants volunteered and were
randomly assigned to experimental conditions. The design
was 2 (vulnerability: high vs. low) 9 2 (mood: positive vs.
negative) 9 2 (argument quality of persuasive message:
weak vs. strong) between-subjects.
Procedure and independent variables
As a cover story, participants were told that they would take
part in a computerized survey about personal values and
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experiences, Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) and health.
Participants were first presented with a short introduction
about RSI and the ‘‘Boston RSI Sensitivity Test’’, and were
led to believe that this test measured their risk of developing
RSI related health problems in the future on the basis of a
personality test. Participants completed the test and were
told that the computer analyzed their responses. Next, they
received false feedback regarding their vulnerability to RSI
on their computer screens. Participants were informed that
their risk of developing RSI related health complaints was
either quite high (high vulnerability condition), or quite low
(low vulnerability condition). Next, participants read a
message that described the negative health consequences of
RSI (e.g., chronic complaints in arms and hands). This
information was held constant across conditions.
Mood was manipulated following the procedure
described by Raghunathan and Trope (2002). Participants
were asked to recall three positive or negative events they
had recently experienced. They were asked to describe
each event in a few sentences, indicating in particular the
details of the event that made the experience positive or
negative for them personally. To boost the credibility of the
mood manipulation in the present health context, partici-
pants were told that research has shown that personal
experiences from the past can have a profound impact on
health, and that the present research was designed to fur-
ther test this possibility. Next, participants were exposed to
the persuasive message, which was presented as a letter
submitted to a journal of health psychology. The message
described RSI prevention training as a way to reduce the
risk of experiencing the negative health consequences of
RSI, and was supported by five weak or five strong argu-
ments that were selected in a pilot study (cf. Petty and
Cacioppo 1986). Examples are: ‘‘Research has demon-
strated that knowledge of RSI-prevention strategies
improved physical and psychological well-being’’ (strong
argument), and ‘‘The institute that developed the RSI-
prevention training would not put the training on the
market unless it was effective’’ (weak argument). After
reading the health message, participants completed the
manipulation checks of vulnerability, mood, and argument
quality, and the thought-listing and attitude measures (in
this order). At the end of the experiment, participants were
thanked for their participation and were extensively
debriefed, in order to make sure that they understood real
purpose of the experiment. None of the participants gues-
sed the real purpose of the experiment, or expressed any
suspicion regarding the experimental procedure.
Manipulation checks
Six items assessed the effectiveness of the vulnerability
manipulation on a 7-point scale. Examples are: ‘‘The chance
that I will develop RSI related health problems is high’’ and
‘‘Due to my sensitivity to RSI I am more prone to RSI related
health problems’’ (Cronbach’s alpha = .90). The effec-
tiveness of the mood manipulation was assessed by 9 items
from the Profile of Mood State (POMS, Wald 1984), mea-
suring the extent to which participants felt specific
emotional states, such as feelings of depression, and relax-
ation. Negative items were reverse-scored; higher scores
yield more positive moods (Cronbach’s alpha = .75, see
Wald 1984 for a complete listing of the items). Three items
assessed perceived argument quality of the health message,
measuring on a 7-point scale how strong, supportive and
sensible participants rated the arguments (Cronbach’s
alpha = .88). Correlations between manipulation checks
did not differ as a function of experimental manipulations.
Dependent measures
Cognitive Processing. Participants completed a thought-
listing task, in which they were asked to write down the
thoughts that came to mind while reading the health message
(cf. Petty and Cacioppo 1986). No time limit was set; par-
ticipants could take all the time they needed. Two
independent judges categorized issue-relevant thoughts in
thoughts confirming (Range 0–4; Kappa = .72) message
content, e.g., ‘‘I am definitely interested in a RSI prevention
training’’ or ‘‘I never knew RSI was that serious’’, and
thoughts discounting message content, e.g., ‘‘I feel the risk
of RSI is exaggerated in this message’’ or ‘‘I am not con-
vinced about the benefits of the proposed RSI prevention
training’’ (Range 0–4; Kappa = .71), and neutral thoughts,
e.g., ‘‘The text reminded me of a book I read some time ago’’
(Range 0–3; Kappa = .70). Disagreements between judges
were solved through discussion. Issue-irrelevant thoughts
were not analyzed (9% of total; cf. Petty and Wegener 1999).
Confirming thoughts correlated negatively with discounting
thoughts, r = -.28, p \ .01, and with neutral thoughts,
r = -.18, p \ .05. Discounting thoughts also correlated
negatively with neutral thoughts, r = -.26, p \ .01.
A thought-listing index was created (cf. Sherman et al.
2000) using the following formula: (confirming issue-rel-
evant thoughts + 1)/(total issue-relevant thoughts + 1).
Index-scores that approach 1 indicate higher levels of
agreement with the health message; scores that approach 0
indicate lower levels of agreement.
Attitudes. Participants’ attitudes toward RSI-prevention
training were assessed by a semantic differential scale with
4 items, using a 7-point scale, including how valuable, and
interesting participants thought this training was (Cron-
bach’s alpha = .76). Attitudes were significantly correlated
with the thought-listing index, r = .45, p \ .001, and
correlations did not differ as a function of experimental
manipulations.




The manipulation checks of mood and vulnerability were
subjected to a 2 (vulnerability: low vs. high) 9 2 (mood:
positive vs. negative) analysis of variance (ANOVA), to
ascertain that the manipulations of vulnerability and mood
were successful in producing the intended effects without
producing unwanted side effects. The 2 9 2 ANOVA on
the manipulation check for vulnerability revealed the
expected main effect for vulnerability, F(1, 117) = 15.74,
p \ .001. Participants in the high vulnerability conditions
felt more vulnerable to RSI (M = 3.65, SD = 1.48) than
participants in the low vulnerability conditions (M = 2.65,
SD = 1.24). Mood did not affect perceptions of vulnera-
bility to RSI, either as a main effect, F(1, 117) = 2.69,
p [ .10, or in interaction with the vulnerability manipula-
tion (F \ 1). A similar ANOVA on the mood-measure
revealed a main effect for mood, F(1, 117) = 4.38,
p \ .05. Participants in the positive mood condition
reported a more positive mood (M = 3.37, SD = .49) than
participants in the negative mood condition (M = 3.13,
SD = .76). Vulnerability did not significantly affect mood,
either as a main effect (F \ 1) or in interaction with the
mood manipulation (F \ 2). A one-way ANOVA on the
manipulation check of perceived argument quality revealed
that, as expected, arguments were perceived as stronger in
the strong arguments condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.24)
than in the weak arguments condition (M = 3.70,
SD = 1.28; F(1, 119) = 6.93, p \ .01). In sum, these
results confirm that the manipulations of mood, vulnera-
bility and argument quality were successful.
Dependent measures
Thought-listing. A 2 (vulnerability) 9 2 (mood) 9 2
(argument quality) ANOVA on the thought-listing index
revealed a significant main effect for vulnerability, F(1,
113) = 8.88, p = .004, and a significant main effect for
mood, F(1, 113) = 3.88, p = .05. Overall, participants had
a more positive thought valence under conditions of high
(M = .65, SD = .29) compared with low vulnerability
(M = .52, SD = .23), and under conditions of positive
mood (M = .63, SD = .26), compared with negative mood
(M = .54, SD = .27). These main effects were qualified,
however, by the hypothesized three-way interaction
between vulnerability, mood, and argument quality, F(1,
113) = 4.83, p \ .05. In line with predictions, simple
effects analyses revealed that positive mood affected the
extent of systematic processing, as indicated by the
increased differentiation between strong and weak argu-
ments on thought valence, only when vulnerability was
high F(1, 113) = 8.98, p = .003 (in all other conditions,
F \ 1). Relevant means are displayed in Table 1.
Attitudes. A 2 (vulnerability) 9 2 (mood) 9 2 (argu-
ment quality) ANOVA on the attitude toward RSI
management training again revealed a three-way interac-
tion between vulnerability, mood, and argument quality,
F(1, 113) = 4.58, p \ .05. Similar to the results for the
thought listing task, simple main effects analyses again
revealed a differentiation between strong and weak argu-
ments for positive mood participants, but only under
conditions of high vulnerability, F(1, 113) = 4.48, p \ .05
(in all other conditions, F \ 1). Relevant means are dis-
played in Table 1. In sum, only participants in high
vulnerability, positive mood conditions reported more
positive thoughts and more positive attitudes toward the
recommendation when argument quality was strong rather
than weak. This sensitivity to argument quality was not
observed in low vulnerability, and negative mood
conditions.
Discussion
The present findings support the hypothesis that a positive
mood increases systematic processing of a threatening
health message, particularly when the information is rele-
vant to the self. When participants felt vulnerable to a
health risk, i.e., under conditions of high self-relevance, a
positive mood increased sensitivity to the quality of the
arguments in the health message. This increased differen-
tiation between strong and weak arguments is a reliable
indicator of systematic message processing (Petty and
Wegener 1999), and was observed on high vulnerability
participants’ thoughts and attitudes regarding the health
message. In contrast, when a health message was not rel-
evant to the self, mood had no effects on information
Table 1 Interactive effects of vulnerability, mood, and argument
quality on thought-listing index and attitudes (Experiment 1)
Condition Thought-listing Attitudes
Argument quality Argument quality
Weak Strong Weak Strong
Low vulnerability
Negative mood 0.51 (0.29) 0.52 (0.20) 4.42 (0.94) 4.64 (1.37)
Positive mood 0.56 (0.27) 0.49 (0.12) 4.39 (0.85) 4.10 (1.30)
High vulnerability
Negative mood 0.59 (0.29) 0.55 (0.31) 4.80 (1.07) 4.52 (0.95)
Positive mood 0.60 (0.27) 0.88 (0.17)** 4.32 (0.88) 5.15 (0.87)*
Note: Significant differences (rows) indicate that participants differ-
entiated between weak and strong arguments in the action
recommendation
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01
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processing or persuasion (also see Das et al. 2003; De
Hoog et al. 2005). These findings are a first demonstration
that the effects of mood on the processing of self-threat-
ening information are moderated by self-relevance. When a
threatening message is relevant to the self, a positive mood
may help receivers to ‘face the facts’, and engage in sys-
tematic processing. When a threatening message has no
direct self-relevance, a positive mood is likely to promote
hedonic concerns, and prompt heuristic message
processing.
Study 2
Study 1 showed how a positive mood affects explicit
cognitive responses to self-threatening information, and
enhances the use of deliberate, systematic processing
strategies. Study 2 was designed to assess whether these
effects extend to the realm of less controlled, automatic
processes, and to gain more insight into implicit responses
to self-relevant versus self-irrelevant health information. It
was hypothesized that the proposed resource function of
positive mood may also work at the implicit level, and
promote attendance to self-relevant information but not to
self-irrelevant information. Under negative mood condi-
tions, this differentiation between self-relevant versus
irrelevant information was not expected to occur, because
individuals were hypothesized to lack the resources needed




A total of 17 men and 15 women with a mean age of 20.66
(SD = 2.42) participated in the experiment. All partici-
pants were identified as smokers. The design was a mood
(positive vs. negative) between subjects and self-relevance
(self-threatening vs. neutral) within subjects mixed design.
Procedure and materials
Participants were told that they would take part in a com-
puterized survey about personal values and experiences,
smoking, and health, and were asked to fill out several
questions related to their smoking behavior. Next, mood
was manipulated by asking participants to recall three
positive or negative events they had recently experienced
(Raghunathan and Trope 2002). As in Study 1, the credi-
bility of the mood manipulation was boosted by telling
participants that research has shown that personal experi-
ences from the past can have a impact on health. Mood was
measured immediately after this mood manipulation with 8
items from the Profile of Mood State (POMS, Wald 1984;
Cronbach’s a = .80). Participants then read a threatening
health message that described the negative health conse-
quences of smoking. The message contained fictitious
statements concerning recently discovered serious and
severe health consequences of smoking, such as an
increased risk of autoimmune diseases, and several types of
cancer. The health message was held constant across
conditions. Participants then performed a lexical decision
task (LDT) that contained the within-subjects manipulation
of self-relevance. In this task, participants had to decide as
quickly as possible if the target word was an existing word
or a nonsense word. The LDT contained 32 neutral words
(e.g., house, dog, and holiday), and 60 nonsense words
(e.g., grapen, adviering, and din). Most important, how-
ever, the LDT also contained 5 self-threatening words from
the health message participants had just read, pertaining to
the adverse health consequences of smoking (hazardous,
danger, death, lung cancer, and risk). All words are single
words in the Dutch language (including lung cancer). The
self-threatening words were selected on the basis of a pilot
study in which participants (N = 30, smokers, not taking
part in the actual experiment) rated on a 7-point scale
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) to what extent these and 10
other words pertained directly to smoking-related health
risks. The five words selected were the ones rated highest
on this measure (M = 5.71, SD = 1.43). All words were
randomly presented and matched on word length across
word type categories. In addition, the pilot study corrobo-
rated that there were no a priori differences in response
latencies between neutral words and target words (F \ 1).
Response latencies on the LDT for the self-threatening
versus neutral words served as our key dependent measure.
Upon finishing the LDT, participants were thanked for their
participation, debriefed, and dismissed. None of the par-
ticipants guessed the real purpose of the study.
Results
Mood
A unifactor ANOVA (mood: negative vs. positive mood)
revealed the expected main effect for mood condition, F(1,
30) = 9.18, p = .005. Participants in the negative mood
condition reported more negative moods (M = 6.13,
SD = .62) than participants in the positive mood condition
(M = 5.42, SD = .70).
Response time analysis
Type of response (i.e., word or non-word) and response
time (in milliseconds) to all LDT words were recorded for
226 Motiv Emot (2008) 32:221–230
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each participant. Incorrect responses to target words and
neutral words were excluded from the analyses (error
rate = 2.87%). Our main interest was whether participants
in positive and negative moods responded differently to
self-threatening words versus neutral words. Thus, the
mean response times for self-relevant words and neutral
words were subjected to a 2 (mood: negative vs. positive
mood) 9 2 (word type: self-threatening vs. neutral) mixed
design ANOVA with repeated measures on the second
factor. This analysis revealed a significant interaction
between mood and word type, F(1, 29) = 5.41, p \ .05
Simple effects analysis revealed that a positive mood
speeded up responses to self-threatening words, F(1,
29) = 4.32, p \ .05, but not to neutral words (F \ 1).1 No
significant differences in response latencies were observed
under negative mood conditions. See Fig. 1.
Discussion
In the present study, smokers read a health message about
the negative consequences of smoking and then responded
to self-threatening illness-words, or neutral words in a
lexical decision task. As expected, the induction of a
positive mood speeded up response latencies to self-
threatening words, but not to neutral words. These findings
suggest that the effects of a positive mood may be partic-
ularly strong when incoming information poses a direct and
relevant threat to the self. This conjecture is further sup-
ported by the fact that a positive mood had no effects on
response times to smoking-related words, i.e., on self-rel-
evant, non-threatening words. Under negative mood
conditions, no differences in response latencies were
observed between self-threatening words and neutral
words. These findings support the hypothesis that a positive
mood better attunes individuals to incoming information
that threatens the self. Thus, under positive mood condi-
tions, smokers responded more quickly to words that
represented a real threat to their health. The fact that these
findings were observed an implicit measure of response
latencies suggests that the effects of mood indeed extend to
the automatic, intuitive, and non-conscious level.
General discussion
Two studies tested the effects of mood on the processing and
acceptance of potentially self-relevant, threatening health
information. It was hypothesized that a positive mood would
increase systematic processing of self-threatening health
information, and, in addition, increase attendance to self-
threatening information on the implicit level. Under nega-
tive mood conditions, individuals were assumed to lack the
resources to deal with self-threatening information.
Accordingly, a negative mood was hypothesized to induce
heuristic processing, and have no effects on implicit atten-
dance to threatening health information. The findings
support the hypotheses. In study 1, a positive mood
increased systematic processing only when a health message
directly pertained to the self. Under conditions of a negative
mood, or low self-relevance, a health message was pro-
cessed heuristically. In study 2, a positive mood speeded up
smokers’ response latencies to threatening information
about smoking, but not to self-irrelevant information. Again,
no effects were observed under negative mood conditions.
The present findings are a first demonstration that a
positive mood can promote systematic processing of ‘cold,
hard, and self-threatening facts’ (Raghunathan and Trope
2002; Trope and Neter 1994). Previous studies have shown
that a positive mood can promote the acceptance of self-












Fig. 1 Interactive effects of mood (negative, positive) and word type
(neutral, self-threatening) on response latencies in milliseconds in a
Lexical Decision Task (Experiment 2)
1 The LDT also included three words from the text participants had
read that were related to smoking but not necessarily to health risks:
cigarette, smoke, and smoking (Mperceived_threat = 3.21, SD = 0.92 in
pilot study). To ascertain that the observed effects were indeed threat-
specific, we conducted an ANOVA in which self-threatening words,
smoking-related words, and neutral words were entered as a within
participants factor, and mood was entered as a between participants
factor. This analysis yielded a significant interaction between word
type and mood, F(1, 54) = 7.29, p \ .01. Simple effects analyses
corroborated that response latencies to self-threatening words were
faster under conditions of a positive mood (M = 540, SE = 24)
rather than a negative mood (M = 613, SE = 23), F(1, 54) = 4.63,
p \ .05. No significant simple effects of mood were observed for
smoking-related words (M = 587, SE = 25 vs. M = 563, SE = 25;
F \ 1) and for neutral words (M = 592, SE = 25 vs. M = 594,
SE = 24, F \ 1).
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evidence regarding underlying cognitive processes. Our
findings show that a positive mood increases intensive
processing of aversive information only when the infor-
mation pertains to the self, and suggest that this systematic
processing may be prompted by a heightened vigilance
toward self-relevant stimuli at the implicit level. Thus, a
positive mood may provide individuals with the resources
to deal with the psychological costs associated with sys-
tematic processing of self-threatening information.
Hence, a positive mood does not necessarily prompt a
shift away from the nitty-gritty details of systematic
information processing, in pursuit of short-term, hedonic
motives (also see Aspinwall 1998; Martin and Davies
1998). Rather, a positive mood increases resources to adapt
processing strategies to fit to specific situational require-
ments (Baumann and Kuhl 2005; Trope et al. 2001). When
the ‘‘self can afford to do so’’, i.e. in a situation of low self-
relevance, a positive mood is likely to promote heuristic
processing of information. In contrast, when incoming
information is relevant to the self, a positive mood is likely
to prompt a switch to more systematic processing modes.
These findings suggest that the increased attendance to
self-threatening information observed in previous studies
(Gervey et al. 2005; Trope and Pomerantz 1998) may have
its origins at the non-conscious, implicit level. This con-
tends to the notion that the happy self is not dormant as far
as information processing is concerned (see also Isbell
2004), but instead has tuned in a ‘surveillance mode’, that
remains active, even nonconsciously.
Self-regulation and health persuasion
The presently observed effects of a positive mood add to a
large body of research on psychological resources that help
dealing with self-threatening information. For instance,
positive affirmations of the self have been found to increase
the acceptance of threatening health information (Harris and
Napper 2005; Reed and Aspinwall 1998; Sherman et al.
2000). According to self-affirmation theory (Steele 1988),
positive affirmations of the self restore self-integrity on a
general level, and consequently functions as a buffer against
self-threatening information. Likewise, psychological
resources of optimism, personal control and meaning have
been found to buffer people against psychological as well as
physical adversity (Taylor and Brown 1988; Taylor et al.
2000; Trope et al. 2001). Thus, our findings underscore the
pivotal role of positive self-related experiences in balancing
psychological threats, and promoting effective self-regulation
(see also Fredrickson 2001; Tugade and Fredrickson 2004).
Health campaigns may also benefit from the present
findings. Many health education efforts aim to ‘shock
receivers into persuasion’ by conveying graphic depictions
and gory details of specific health threats. The assumption
underlying these campaigns is that severely threatening
health messages force individuals to attend to health
information, and change unhealthy behaviors. Recent
findings suggest, however, that the effects of emotions and
message framing on processing of health messages vary
across individuals (e.g., Sherman et al. 2006). The present
study adds to these findings by showing that scary health
campaigns do not automatically increase message atten-
dance, or systematic processing. Based on the present
results, future health campaigns may benefit from creating
a subtle balance between emphasizing self-relevance (i.e.,
vulnerability) and fostering positive moods. Hence, a
threatening health message may benefit from the inclusion
of positive mood-gaining persuasive elements, such as
humor, that help receivers cope with the self-regulatory
costs of a self-relevant health threat.
Limitations and future directions
It was argued that a positive mood promotes attendance to,
and systematic processing of self-threatening information,
compared with negative mood conditions. Of course, the
mood differences observed after our mood manipulations
should be viewed as relative, and not absolute. Accord-
ingly, we cannot tell where exactly these mood effects
start, and where they will end. For instance, although we
did not find any systematic mood effects of the manipu-
lation of vulnerability in the present research, it is hard to
verify the overall mood effect of participating in a study
about health, or the effect of being presented with false
feedback regarding a certain health risk. Hence, the present
study provides little insight whether it is the absence of
negative moods, the presence of mildly positive moods or
extremely positive moods that increases systematic pro-
cessing of self-threatening facts. This should not be
problematic if we view mood itself as a gradual, relative
phenomenon, rather than in absolute terms. For instance,
few people may be able to achieve a mood state that is
actually neutral (with the exception perhaps of some well-
trained Buddhist monks). Thus, the present research simply
shows that individuals become better at facing ‘cold, hard’
facts to the extent that they are in better moods.
Second, we have argued that a positive mood may
function as a resource to deal with self-threatening facts,
quite similar to other psychological resources such as self-
affirmation, and optimism. A question that remains, how-
ever, is how a positive mood buffers the costs associated
with self-threatening information. Recent findings suggest
that a positive mood may promote the integration of
information into the self-system, which may serve to down-
regulate the associated negative affect (Bolte et al. 2003;
Koole and Jostmann 2004). These findings fit nicely with
the presently observed interaction between self-relevance
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and mood. Specifically, a positive mood should only
increase the integration of information into the self-system
if the information is actually relevant to the self. This
integrative processing may function as a buffer against the
psychological costs associated with self-threatening infor-
mation. Explicit tests of integrative processing following a
positive mood constitute an important agenda for future
studies. Also, future studies may benefit from including a
condition with self-relevant, but non-threatening (e.g.,
neutral, positive) information as a comparison to self-rel-
evant, threatening information, in order to assess whether
the presently observed effects of mood generalize to all
self-relevant stimuli regardless of valence.
Finally, it is plausible that there are limits to the pres-
ently observed effects of a positive mood. When the
incoming information becomes severely and irremediably
threatening, a positive mood may cease to be effective in
promoting systematic processing of threatening health
information. Of interest, recent studies regarding a differ-
ent self-regulatory resource, i.e. self-affirmation, suggest
that the beneficial effects of self-affirmation may be limited
to moderate threats, and backfire when threats become very
severe (see De Wit et al. 2007). Future studies may want to
examine if there are similar limits to the effects of a
positive mood in buffering threats to the self.
Concluding comments
Few people enjoy hearing bad news about some aspect of
themselves that they deeply value, whether it concerns their
intelligence, social skills, or their health. ‘‘I’m not in the mood
to deal with this right now’’, is an often-heard response to self-
threatening information. Indeed, the present findings show
that individuals may be too ‘tense and nervous to face up to
the facts’ and, as a consequence, engage in heuristic pro-
cessing of important information. A positive mood may help
overcome such momentary concerns, and promote systematic
processing, even if it concerns the ugly truth about oneself.
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